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CONTROLLING DISCRETION IN SENTENCING: THE
CLEMENCY BOARD AS A WORKING MODEL
William A. Strauss*
and
Lawrence M. Baskir**
I. Introduction
The exercise of discretionary judgment is fundamental to any system of jus-
tice; but equally fundamental is the consistent treatment of all individuals. Yet
to achieve the latter necessitates a reasonable balance between flexibility and
strict accountability to rules. Conscious efforts to achieve this balance are nor-
mally made throughout the American legal system. However, in at least one
area-the sentencing of convicted criminals--the system is wanting.
Attorney General Edward Levi has accused the sentencing process of hav-
ing "an accidental quality" in which imprisoned offenders consider themselves
"losers in a game of chance. " ' This, he concludes, can only harm efforts at reha-
bilitation:
Not only may it appear to an offender that his imprisonment was just bad
luck rather than the inevitable consequence of wrongdoing, the unfairness
bred of inefficiency and unwillingness to impose uniform punishment may
make the society outside the prison wall seem mean and hostile, a society that
itself does not follow the rules of conduct it expects the ex-offender to follow. 2
Typically, judges are free to make sentencing decisions according to their
own personal standards.' As an inevitable result, "the sentence a particular defen-
dant gets is often dependent in considerable measure on the trial judge he got-
or who got him."' What is ironic is that this unstructured sentencing decision
* Faculty Fellow, University of Notre Dame; formerly Director of Planning, Manage-
ment, and Evaluation at the Presidential Clemency Board; J.D., M.P.P. 1973, Harvard.
** Faculty Fellow, University of Notre Dame; formerly General Counsel (staff director)
at the Presidential Clemency Board; L.L.B., 1962, Harvard.
The authors wish to thank Michael A. Remington for his research and editorial assistance
in preparing this article.
1 Address by Attorney General Edward H. Levi before the Governor of Wisconsin's Con-
ference on Employment and the Prevention of Crime, February 2, 1976.
2 Id.
3 Judge Lombard gave the following example at the 1965 Philadelphia Judicial Sentencing
Institute:
You may have heard of the visitor to a Texas court who was amazed to hear the
judge impose a suspended sentence where a man had pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
A few minutes later the same judge sentenced a man who pleaded guilty to stealing a
horse and gave him life imprisonment. At recess he was introduced to the judge, and
he expressed surprise at these sentences. The judge thought a moment and replied,
"Well, down here there is some men that need killin', and there ain't no horses that
need stealin'."
Lombard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 399, 409 (1965).
4 Frankel, Comments on an Independent, Variable Sentencer, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 667(1973). See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEW OF SENTENCES, 27-28
(Approved Draft, 1968); R. DAwsoN, SENTENCING, cl. 8 (1969); S. RUBIN, THE LAw OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION, 116-119 (1963).
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follows a very highly disciplined legal process for establishing guilt. Yet in most
criminal cases, the sentence, and not the question of guilt, is the key issue.5 Recog-
nizing this problem, critics of sentencing practices have called for more structure
in the process:'
The power of judges to sentence criminal defendants is one of the best ex-
amples of unstructured discretionary power that can and should be struc-
tured. The degree of disparity from one judge to another is widely regarded
as a disgrace to the legal system. All the elements of structuring are needed-
open plans, policy statements and rules, findings and reasons, and open
precedents.7
One reaction to the undisciplined discretion of sentencing judges is the effort
to impose mandatory minimum sentences, including certain provisions in the
controversial Senate bill, S. 18 Other proposals have been advanced, but work-
ing models have been slow to emerge from American courts and legislatures.9
The Presidential Clemency Board recently developed a working model, in-
spired in part by the Board's reaction to the uneven treatment of convicted draft
offenders by Federal judges.' In its final report, the Clemency Board noted that
5 See the report of the American Bar Association, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
REVIEW OF SENTENCES, as quoted in W. GAYLIN, IN SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY, 323-324
(1970).
6 Many of the critics are judges themselves. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES
(1973); Devitt, How Can We Effectively Minimize Unjustified Disparity in Federal Criminal
Sentences? 42 F.R.D. 218 (1967); Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure,
45 NEB. L. Ryv. 499 (1966); Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentence, 40 F.R.D. 55
(1967); Wyzanski, A Trial judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARVARD L. REV. 1281
(1952).
7 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, 133 (1971).
8 E.g., S. 2698, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced November 20, 1975, by Senator Ken-
nedy). The bill would provide minimum sentences of two years for burglary, aggravated
assault, the use of a deadly weapon, and other specified offenses. The mandatory minimums
do not apply if the defendant is under 18 years, if he was acting under duress, if he suffers
from substantially impaired mental capacity, or if no serious bodily harm was inflicted.
Moreover, The Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
is the current proposal for the reform of the federal criminal code. It provides only general
guidance for judges, except for the imposition of capital punishment. Judges are directed
to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the background of the defendant,
deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation, "respect for the law" and "just punish-
ment" in determining how much imprisonment or probation to adjudge (Sections 2102, 2302).
In imposing fines, the court is directed to consider, in addition, the defendant's ability to pay,
any economic hardship on himself and his dependents, and the likelihood of reparation or
restitution to the victim '(Section 2202). S. 1 also provides for appellate review of sentences,
authorizing an increase or reduction in severity if the sentence is "clearly unreasonable"
(Section 3725). S. 1 is far more precise with respect to the imposition of the death penalty.
The penalty is mandatory if the court or jury finrd present one or more of 11 specified
factors and the defendant has been convicted of a Class A felony involving murder, treason,
sabotage or espionage. The penalty is precluded if, nonetheless, one or more of six extenuat-
ing circumstances are present (Section 2401).
S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced on November 20, 1975, by Senator Kennedy)
sets forth similar criteria for the imposition of fines, probation or imprisonment. It would
create a Commission on Sentencing, one of whose major functions would be to develop guide-
lines for the determination of appropriate sentences. Judges would have to apply these
guidelines in determining sentences and their decisions would be subject to appellate review
to determine whether the guidelines were properly applied.
9 Sentencing councils and appellate review of sentencing have been implemented by a
number of jurisdictions. See generally the A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
10 See also Sentencing Selective Service Violators: A judicial Wheel of Fortune, 5:2 COL.
J. OF LAw & Soa. PROB. 164 (1969).
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sentences for draft offenses were "inconsistent and widely varying, dependent to
a great extent upon year of conviction, geography, race, and religion."'" From
1968 to 1974, the percentage of draft offenders sentenced to prison declined from
74% to 22%. 12 Some judges never sent a draft offender to prison, while others
always imposed the five-year statutory maximum." Blacks, Jehovah's Witnesses,
and others outside the middle-class mainstream were treated more harshly for
crimes that were no worse than those of other draft offenders' 4
Cognizant of these consequences of uncontrolled discretion, the Clemency
Board decided that it had to impose a measure of discipline upon itself. 5 As a
result, rules were developed and made binding. Board members often became
restless under these rules. They were torn between the competing demands of
consistency and flexibility, sometimes complaining that strict adherence to rules
interfered with the reaching of fair judgments in individual cases. What emerged
was a balance between the rigid application of rules and the subjective exercise
of discretion.
As it disciplined its exercise of discretion, the Clemency Board implemented
a number of techniques which should be applicable by sentencing judges. 6 First,
the Board developed and published a clear set of substantive rules to serve as
criteria for case judgments, and it followed procedures which ensured that these
rules were explicitly applied in each case. Second, it identified past precedents
and employed them as a basis for deciding subsequent cases. Third, it im-
plemented a system of internal appellate review through which inconsistent judg-
ments could be identified and reconsidered. Fourth, it created a record which
enabled its decision-making performance to be evaluated.
Taken together, these efforts resulted in a startling and measurable degree
of consistency and fairness in case judgments. Statistics show that the Board did
in fact follow its designated rules.' As a consequence, the Board achieved one of
its major goals: that of treating persons with disadvantaged backgrounds in an
evenhanded manner' s
The Clemency Board's experience was limited in time and context, and
cannot be regarded as a panacea for the complex problems inherent in judicial
sentencing. However, the procedures worked and can serve as a case study for
application in other areas of the law. After examining and analyzing the Board's
procedures, this article suggests measures which may be useful to the sentencing
process.
11 PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT '(hereinafter referred to
as REPORT), 49 (1975).
12 Id. (Cited from the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS FOR 1968 AND 1974.)
13 The most extreme sentence was given to a black civil rights worker in Louisiana: five
concurrent five-year sentences for separate draft violation charges. By contrast, a Wisconsin
defendant recently received a sentence of probation for one day under the Federal Youth Cor-
rections Act, under which his conviction record was then expunged.
14- REPoar, supra note 11, at 49.
15 According to Board member Hesburgh, "the Board was willing to do anything it could
to get away from the vast swing of the draft sentences." Conversation with Rev. T. Hesburgh.
16 These techniques are described infra in the order presented here.
17 See infra. See also REPORT, supra note 11, at ch. 5.
18 See notes 16-53, 67-76, and accompanying text infra.
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II. The Clemency Board Experience
A. Initial Experience with Uncontrolled Discretion
The Presidential Clemency Board 9 was charged with the responsibility of
making clemency recommendations for some 15,000"0 applicants to President
Ford's program for Vietnam-era draft and military offenders.2 The Board had
19 The Presidential Clemency Board was created on September 16, 1974, by President
Gerald R. Ford in Proclamation 4313 and the accompanying Executive Order 11803 of the
same date (reproduced in REPORT, supra note 11, App. B). The Clemency Board was origi-
nally to have been in existence until December 31, 1976 '(see § 9 of the Executive Order),
but it was instead terminated on September 15, 1975. The Board submitted its Report to the
President on December 15, 1975. Carry-over administrative tasks were delegated to a newly
designated Clemency Office in the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice.
Upon completion of these functions, scheduled for March 31, 1976, any residual matters are
the responsibility of the Pardon Attorney himself.
The Chairman of the Clemency Board was Charles E. Goodell, former United States
Senator from New York. The Board originally had a total of eight members: Dr. Ralph Adams,
James P. Dougovito, Robert H. Finch, Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, Vernon E. Jordan,
James A. Maye, Aida Casanas O'Connor, and General Lewis W. Walt. In April, 1975, the
Board was increased by Executive Order to 18 members because of the expanded workload.
The new members were Timothy Lee Craig, John A. Everhard, W. Antoinette Ford, John Roy
Kauffmann, Rev. Msgr. Francis J. Lally, E. Frederick Morrow, Lewis B. Puller, Jr., Harry
Riggs, and Joan Vinson. Robert H. Finch resigned from the Board in June and was replaced
by Robert S. Carter. For biographies of the Board members, see RaoRT, supra note 11,
App. A-
20 The Clemency Board received approximately 21,500 applications, of which some 6,000
were found to be ineligible. From among the 15,468 eligible applications, the Clemency Board
made 14,514 case recommendations to the President before it terminated operations on Sep-
tember 15, 1975. The Board took no action on the remaining 954 cases because of insufficient
information; the carry-over Clemency Office in the Department of Justice later made case
recommendations for those cases in which the necessary information could be obtained. Id.,
at 163-165. Only the President can exercise the constitutional power to grant pardons, and no
Clemency Board case recommendation was final until approved by him. See U.S. CoNST. art.
I, § 2, cl. 1, and the discussion in REPORT, supra note 11 at 11-12. As of March 1, 1976, the
President had acted upon all but 750 case recommendations and, without exception, he ac-
cepted the judgment of the Board.
21 The Clemency Board had jurisdiction over draft offenders who had been convicted for
one of the following violations of § 12 of the Selective Service Act: (1) failure to register for
the draft, or failure to register on time; (2) failure to keep the local draft board informed of
his current address; (3) failure to report for or submit to preinduction or induction examina-
tion; (4) failure to report for or submit to induction; or (5) failure to complete alternative
service to satisfy the requirements of a conscientious-objector exemption. Draft offenders
who were fugitives still charged with such violations were the jurisdiction of the Depart-
ment of Justice, which implemented a separate part of the President's clemency program.
To be eligible, an applicant must have committed his offense between August 4, 1964, and
March 28, 1973, and he must not have been an alien excluded by law from entering the
United States under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (22) (1970).
The Clemency Board also had jurisdiction over military offenders who received Undesir-
able, Bad Conduct, or Dishonorable Discharges as a result of violations of Articles 85 (deser-
tion), 86 (AWOL), or 87 (missing movement) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10
U.S.C. §§ 885, 886, 887 (1970)). Military offenders who were fugitives still charged with
such violations were the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, which implemented a
separate part of the President's clemency program.
Of the 8,700 convicted draft offenders eligible to apply to the Clemency Board, 1,879
(22%) applied. Of the approximately 90,000 discharged military offenders eligible to apply
to the Board, 13,589 (15%) applied. Of the 4,522 fugitive draft offenders eligible for the
Department of Justice clemency program, 706 (16%) applied. Of the 10,115 fugitive mili-
tary offenders eligible for the Department of Defense clemency program, 5,555 (55%) applied.
Altogether, 21,729 of the approximately 113,000 eligible persons applied resulting in an overall
participation of 19%.
For a further description of eligibility criteria and application statistics, see REPORT, supra
note 11, at 7-9, 21-22.
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to decide whether each individual should be granted a Presidential pardon,2
and how much, if any, alternative service he had to perform to earn it.2s Although
the Board was bestowing benefits rather than imposing punishment, it had a
decision-making function comparable to that of a sentencing judge.24 A judge's
decisions range from minimal probation to the maximum period of imprisonment
allowed by law. The Clemency Board's judgments ranged from immediate
pardons to the maximum 24-month period of alternative service set by the
President,2 with the most severe judgment being the denial of clemency in any
form.
26
President Ford directed the Board to review every application individually.2
Aside from the not very helpful precedent of the Truman Amnesty Board,2s the
Clemency Board had no prior experience to guide it in recommending executive
clemency on a case-by-case basis.29 Accordingly, the Board had to independently
fashion the substantive standards and procedures applicable for these cases.20
In doing so, it very quickly recognized the importance of making the fairness and
consistency of its decisions apparent to the clemency applicants and the
22 The Presidential pardon was the remedy offered convicted draft offenders who applied
to the Clemency Board. For discharged military offenders, the remedy was a Presidential
pardon and a recharacterization of discharge as a "Clemency Discharge," a new type of dis-
charge created for the purposes of this program. For a discussion of the implications of these
remedies (and a description of the remedies offered by the Department of justice and Depart-
ment of Defense clemency program), see REPORT, supra note 11, at 15-21.
23 This alternative service was to be performed in a position which served the "national
health, safety, or interest" and which did not take a job away from any other qualified indi-
vidual. Applicants to the Clemency Board who were assigned to six months or less of alterna-
tive service could fill part-time, volunteer positions which would not require an interruption
of their regular jobs. The Selective Service System was given the responsibility of supervising
the performance of assigned periods of alternative service. See Executive Order 11804, 39
Fed. Reg. 33297 (1974), and REPORT, supra note 11, at 17-21. The performance of alterna-
tive service has been uneven so far, and it appears that perhaps as many as 6,000 of the
Clemency Board applicants will fail to complete alternative service.
24 One point of disagreement between the Clemency Board and the proamnesty community
has been over whether the Board was in fact engaged in "sentencing" of applicants. The
latter always maintained that alternative service was punitive and that the Clemency Board
was meting out alternative service "sentences." See the Statement made by Henry
Schwarzschild of the ACLU Amnesty Project in Hearings on Clemency Program Practices and
Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Committee on the judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74 (1974). However, the Board's posi-
tion was that it was offering a benefit which could be accepted or rejected by every applicant.
Indeed, every Clemency Board applicant could refuse to perform alternative service without
legal jeopardy, and no Presidential pardon could be effective unless accepted by its recipient.
This was not so much a debate over whether the Board was following or should follow pro-
cedures comparable to those of a sentencing judge, but rather over the merits of the alternative
service aspect of the President's clemency program.
25 Presidential Proclamation 4313, 39 Fed. Reg. 33293 '(1974).
26 Executive Order #11803, 39 Fed. Reg. 33297, § 3 (1974).
27 See generally Proclamation 4313 and accompanying Presidential statement, 39 Fed. Reg.
33297 (1974).
28 The 1946-47 Truman Amnesty Board decided cases according to broad categories, not
on a case-by-case basis. Also, it denied clemency to 90% of its 15,805 applicants. Its report
is reproduced in full in Hearings on Selective Service and Amnesty Before the Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., 185-89 (1972).
29 The Pardon Attorney in the Department of Justice recommends pardons after a case-
by-case review, but the Board did not think that his procedures could be applied to the
clemency program.
30 REPORT, supra note 11, at 83ff.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
general public. 1
With the delegation of broad discretion from the President, no help from
any precedents, and a predominantly lay membership, 2 the Clemency Board was
faced with the problem of determining how to proceed. At its very first meeting,
the Board agreed that it would identify and publish a list of factors to help it
review cases.
The Board's original intent was to have these factors serve as informal guide-
lines for case judgments, reserving the right to identify and apply other criteria
freely. The Board honed this tentative list into what it called "mitigating" and
"aggravating" factors, using them to review its first 16 cases. As guidelines, the
factors contributed little stability to the Board's decision-making process."3 In-
deed, sharp disagreements arose among Board members about the purpose of the
clemency program, resulting in some near-resignations.3 4
In these first 16 cases, virtually identical cases were decided differently. For
example, two draft offenders had each committed the same crime under almost
identical circumstances; the one who was white, religious, and from a well-to-do
family was recommended for an immediate pardon- but the black immigrant
from the West Indies was denied clemency, perhaps because of an offhand com-
ment in his record that he was "clever." In these and the other 14 cases, Board
decisions were often based on aspects of the case which had no relationship to any
of the mitigating and aggravating factors previously established. Rather, a juvenile
arrest record for possession of beer, involvement in an alternative-lifestyle com-
mune, participation in a "rock" band, and even jaywalking convictions became
the actual but unspoken bases for judgments by the Board. 5
The application of inappropriate standards and the resulting inconsistent
case judgments were the necessary product of the ad hoc process the Board
used in reaching decisions. While each member privately focused on aspects of
31 Clemency Board case judgments were as follows:
Civilian Cases Military Cases
Immediate pardon 1432 82% 4620 36%
Alternative service:
3 months 140 8% 2555 20%
4-6 months 91 5% 2941 23%
7+ months 68 4% 1756 14%
No clemency 26 1% 885 7%
(Source: Id., xxiii.)
32 The eighteen-member Board consisted of five lawyers and thirteen nonlawyers.
33 "Everybody was going in different directions in these cases," notes Board member Hes-
burgh. "Some Board members wanted to give everyone the maximum, and some always wanted
to give the minimum." Conversation with Rev. T. Hesburgh.
34 The Board included a number of individuals who had earlier taken strong public posi-
tions on these issues. For example, Father Theodore M. Hesburgh (President of the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame) had been a long-standing opponent of the Vietnam War and an advocate
of unconditional amnesty; General Lewis W. Walt (Commandant of Marine forces in Viet-
nam during the war) had the opposite point of view. The Board's Chairman, Charles E.
Goodell, had opposed the war as a United States Senator but was not in favor of unconditional
amnesty. Understandably, the development of Board positions required substantial time and
compromise.
35 At the time, staff attorney procedures were just as unstructured as Board procedures.
Vague, unsubstantiated, or irrelevant facts were sometimes included in case summaries. After
the first 16 cases, the work of staff attorneys was monitored by a special quality control unit.
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the case he or she thought most important, they rarely articulated the real basis
for their decisions. No attempt was made to reach a collective agreement in each
case on the presence or absence of the criteria the Board had previously designated
as relevant. Consequently, there was no way to prevent any member from apply-
ing his or her personal, and often unconscious, standards, or even to know what
those standards might be.
While board members seemed reasonably satisfied with their decisions in
each case, the overall results were disturbing. If any pattern emerged in this first
collection of decisions, it was a favoring of the applicant with a middle-class
background, with a demonstrated respect for authority, and with a conventional
lifestyle. In fact, statistical analysis of those sixteen cases shows that "convention-
ality of lifestyle" was a more significant predictor of Board judgments than any
of the officially designated aggravating and mitigating factors. In effect, the
Board had discarded its agreed-upon list of substantive rules and was proceeding
on the more comfortable basis of "gut-level" justice.s0
The bad experience with these sixteen cases proved a blessing. Once
alerted to what it was doing, the Board imposed more stringent standards of con-
sistency both on itself and on the staff attorneys preparing the cases. In doing
so, the Board reluctantly acknowledged the need to control its exercise of discre-
tion through adherence to more rigorous procedures. It solved this problem
through a number of techniques which appear equally applicable to the judicial
sentencing process.
B. Developing Rules
1. Baseline Formulation
Right after the Board's assessment of its first 16 case decisions, it met in
executive session to transform its tentative guidelines into binding rules. The
Board clarified the alternative service "baseline" formula and the mitigating and
aggravating factors which would be used as the explicit bases for all case judg-
ments." Only when mitigating factors outweighed aggravating factors could the
alternative service assignment be reduced below the baseline. Conversely, the
alternative service assignment could be increased above the baseline or clemency
might be denied altogether only when aggravating factors outweighed miti-
gating factors. The Board went up or down from its baseline in three- or six-
month increments according to subjective measures of the relative strength of the
factors. With minor modifications, this became the structure for the exercise of
Board discretion and the making of consistent case judgments.
The alternative service "baseline" was a fixed formula used as a starting
point for determining the amount of alternative service." Mathematically cal-
culated, it took account of an applicant's initial sentence, his time in jail, and
36 REPORT, supra note 11, at 328.
37 At first, the Board established eleven mitigating factors and seven aggravating factors,
later expanded to sixteen and twelve, respectively. See Figure 1, infra, for the final list of factors.
38 It should be noted that this "baseline" was neither a minimum nor a maximum. It was
more of a target median, with the expectation that approximately equal numbers of cases would
be decided on either side of it. See REPoRT, supra note 11, at 126.
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other factors.3 9 One theory behind the formula was that the Board should, with-
out discretion, give credit for court-imposed penalties paid by each applicant.
Equally fundamental to the formula was the Board's philosophy that only nomi-
nal amounts of alternative service should be assigned to most applicants. The
formula resulted in initial baselines of 3 to 6 months for 99% of the applicants-
well below the 24-month maximum set by the President.4"
With applicants having virtually identical baselines, mitigating and aggra-
vating factors accounted for nearly all differences in Board judgments. The 16
mitigating factors and 12 aggravating factors represented a composite of the
concerns of Board members with different philosophies. Some argued strongly
for mitigating factors which would take account of conscientious opposition to
the Vietnam War and disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds. Others were
primarily concerned about applicants' criminal records and experience as soldiers.
Almost all factors were established by consensus; only a few were put to a vote. 1
2. Developing Mitigating and Aggravating Factors: Policy Considerations
Board members had three standards in mind as they developed the list of
mitigating and aggravating factors:4
(1) Had an applicant demonstrated that he had already earned a
grant of clemency?
(2) Was his background such as to make him "worthy" of clemency?
(3) Could the clemency program help him in a particular way?
39 The "other factors" were the time spent on probation or parole, time spent performing
alternative service, and the judge's initial sentence. The baseline formula worked as follows:
(1) Starting with the maximum baseline of 24 months, three months were reduced for
every month of confinement. The baseline was further reduced by one month for every month
of court-ordered alternative service, probation, or parole previously served, provided that the
applicant had not been prematurely terminated because of lack of cooperation.
(2) If this baseline calculation was greater than the applicant's sentence from a federal
judge or court-martial, that original sentence became the baseline.
(3) The minimum baseline was three months, without exception.
(4) Applicants who had been sentenced to probation or discharged administratively
from the Armed Forces were considered to have sentences of zero months imprisonment. Their
baseline was the three-month minimum. Id., at 95-96.
40 The Clemency Board assigned much less alternative service than either the Depart-
ment of Justice or the Department of Defense clemency programs. Each of the latter had a
fixed baseline of 24 months which was reduced in some cases because of mitigating circum-
stances. Most applicants to the Justice and Defense programs were assigned to 18-24 months
of alternative service. Id., at 145-147. The Clemency Board justified its more lenient decisions
as a reflection of "the basic difference between Clemency Board applicants and those eligible
for the Justice and Defense programs. Clemency Board applicants had already paid a legal
penalty for their offenses; they had received civilian or military convictions, or less-than-
honorable administrative discharges. Also, a pardon could never be as beneficial a remedy as
complete relief from prosecution or administrative punishment." Id., at 95.
41 The only factor ever rejected was a proposal to make habitual drug use an aggravating
factor. At the time, the Board was applying mitigating factor #3 (mental or physical prob-
lems) to persons with serious drug habits, and it voted to continue that practice.
42 For a list of these factors, see Figure 1, infra. The standards noted here were not
specifically articulated by the Board, but they were implicit in Board discussions. The Clemency
Board Report notes that the factors can also be categorized as follows: the reason for the
offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the individual's overall record in the mili-
tary, his overall record in the civilian community, and circumstances surrounding his applica-
tion for clemency. REPORT, supra note 11, at 97ff.
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The notion of "earning" clemency was central to the philosophy behind the
President's program: one earned re-entry into the mainstream of American
society.43 This stressed that some measure of justice had to be struck between
clemency applicants and those who had satisfactorily discharged their obligations
of national service. This was consistent with the President's and the Board
majority's view that most clemency applicants still owed a debt of service to their
country. Also underlying this notion of "earning" clemency was a theory of
general deterrence. The clemency program had to demonstrate to future gene-
rations of soldiers and draft-eligible persons that those who unlawfully evaded
service would not receive clemency unless they earned it.'
The "worthiness" of an individual's application for clemency was far more
subjective. The majority view, by no means unanimous, was that the conscien-
tious war resister was the clemency applicant for whom the program was espe-
cially intended.4 s Yet as the Board began to hear military cases, it discovered
that military applicants seldom went AWOL because of expressed opposition to
the war. The more common reasons were personal or family problems, proce-
dural unfairness on the part of the military, or a lack of sufficient intelligence or
language skills to cope well with military life. The Board, believing these reasons
could be sympathetic enough to make an individual worthy of clemency, estab-
lished them as mitigating factors. Conversely, individuals whom the Board
thought the President did not have in mind were distinguished on the basis of
certain aggravating factors such as long or repeated AWOL offenses, the use of
force in committing the qualifying offense, and a record of nondraft-related felony
convictions.4"
The final notion, that of helping or rehabilitating a person through a grant
of clemency, had more limited application. Some applicants had service-incurred
disabilities, others had serious mental or physical problems, and many more had
unresolved personal problems. For some, alternative service was seen as a means
of self-help; for others, with serious personal or family problems, it would have
been a heavy and meaningless burden. Certain categories of military applicants
43 See generally Proclamation 4313 and the accompanying Presidential statement, 39 Fed.
Reg. 33293 (1974).
44 Yet for some, this debt had already been partially or completely satisfied. A surprising
percentage (27%) of Clemency Board military applicants were Vietnam veterans, many with
combat wounds or decorations. Even those who never went to Vietnam often had performed
long periods of meritorious military service before committing their offenses. Many convicted
draft offenders had performed substantial periods of court-ordered alternative service. These
and other related circumstances were designated as "mitigating." Considered "aggravating"
were indications of an applicant's failure to serve when called upon, for example, by deserting
in a war zone, failing to report to Vietnam when ordered, or failing to complete court-ordered
alternative service. See REPoRT, supra note 11, at ch. 3-4 for a description of the applicants
and the exact manner in which the Board applied each mitigating and aggravating factor.
The Vietnam veteran discussion appears at 60-65.
45 Some Board members wanted to deny clemency to conscientious war resisters who, it
was said, "knew what they were doing" when they committed draft offenses.
46 The Clemency Board's experience with this last aggravating factor reflects the com-
promise and fragile consensus which went into the establishment of these rules. Some Board
members considered these offenses to be unrelated to the clemency mission, urging that they be
disregarded altogether. Others insisted that applicants convicted of felony offenses be denied
clemency automatically, much as the Truman Amnesty Board had excluded persons with crim-
inal records. Instead, the Board adopted the middle view, considering felony convictions to be
a "highly aggravating factor." R.sPoRT, supra note 11, at xxi.
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were recommended by the Board for veteran's benefits, especially medical bene-
fits, which would help them readjust to civilian life after difficult tours in Viet-
nam.47 Some mitigating factors were created to account for these rehabilitative
needs. The only way an applicant's lack of rehabilitative potential was trans-
lated into an aggravating factor was if he had a criminal record for a very serious
felony offense; especially if he was currently facing a long period of incarceration.
For these individuals, the clemency program could be of little help.
The full list of mitigating and aggravating factors is presented in Figure 1,'
with notation of how frequently each was applied in civilian and military cases.
3. Insuring Consistent Application: General Case Procedures
To structure the application of these rules, the Board implemented standard
procedures by which all cases were processed.49 Based upon official records, a
completed application form, and communication with the applicant, a staff attor-
ney prepared a summary for each case. After an internal review," the case sum-
mary was submitted to Board members for study. During Board meetings, staff
attorneys and their immediate supervisors were present to answer Board member
questions or read statements submitted by applicants.
The Clemency Board's baseline formula, mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors, and general case procedures were published in the Federal Register on No-
vember 27, 1974, approximately one month after the Board had reassessed its first
16 cases.51 The primary purpose of publication was to make the rules binding
on the Board-an element essential to any application of this model in the judicial
setting. Another purpose was to enable potential applicants to understand the
basis by which the Board would make judgments in their cases. It was hoped
that notice of Board regulations and application materials would encourage appli-
cants to submit information establishing the presence of mitigating factors or the
absence of aggravating factors. Unfortunately, applicants were not well coun-
seled." Few applicants had lawyers, and many of the rest did not appreciate the
importance of submitting information bearing on the factors. Thus, the Clemency
Board's rules were much more effective as a means of controlling its own discre-
47 Proclamation 4313, 39 Fed. Reg. 33293 (1974), specifically notes that Clemency Dis-
charges "shall not bestow entitlement to benefits ... ." Despite this, the Clemency Board recom-
mended that the President personally exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces by (a) personally directing the discharge upgrades of the most meritorious
applicants, (b) referring other cases with slightly less merit to the military discharge review
boards for special consideration, and (c) referring cases involving service-incurred physical
disabilities to the Veterans' Administration for medical benefits only. The President never
specifically acted on these recommendations and, given the passage of time, it appears that
they have been "pocket-vetoed."
48 R oT, supra note 11, at 127.
49 Id., at 24-26, 85-94.
50 Each applicant had a 30-day opportunity to comment on his case summary. Because of
the press of time, cases were decided before the end of the 30-day comment period. Comments
were rarely received about case summaries; when this happened, a case was submitted to another
Board panel de novo if the comments -or corrections were possibly material.
51 39 Fed. Reg. 41351 (1974).
52 Only about two percent of the applicants had any legal assistance. REPORT, supra note
11, at 94.
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tion than as a means of helping applicants to improve their chances before the
Board.
While the actual impact of this notice provision was disappointing, this
experience should prove helpful in fashioning the Board's model to suit other
sentencing situations. Surely, there are more sophisticated means available to
the courts in seeking information of this nature than was available to the Board,
such as presentencing reports, probation and parole records, and evidentiary
Figure 1: FREQUENCY OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING
FACTORS (Percent)
Civilian Military
Agg 1 Other adult convictions 4% 53%
Agg 2 False statement to the Board 0 0
Agg 3 Use of physical force in offense 0 0
Agg 4 AWOL in Vietnam 0 2
Agg 5 Selfish motivation for offense 15 31
Agg 6 Failure to do alternative service 4 0
Agg 7 Violation of probation or parole 5 7
Agg 8 Multiple AWOL offenses 1* 36
Agg 9 Lengthy AWOL offense 0 72
Agg 10 Missed overseas movement 0 7
Agg 11 Unfitness discharge with other offenses 0 5
Agg 12 Apprehension by authorities 8 37
No Aggravating Factors 72 1
Mit 1 Inability to understand obligations 3 32
Mit 2 Personal or family problems 9 45
Mit 3 Mental or physical condition 9 19
Mit 4 Public service employment 57 2
Mit 5 Service-connected disability 0 2
Mit 6 Substantial military service 2* 35
Mit 7 Vietnam service 1* 26
Mit 8 Procedural unfairness 6 14
Mit 9 Questionable denial of CO status 8 0
Mit 10 Conscientious motivation for offense 72 3
Mit 11 Voluntary submission to authorities 59 37
Mit 12 Mental stress from combat 0 5
Mit 13 Combat volunteer 0 9
Mit 14 Above average military performance 1* 39
Mit 15 Decorations for valor 0 2
Mit 16 Wounds in combat 0 4
No Mitigating Factors 5 2
* A small number of civilian applicants entered military service after their draft
offenses.
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showings. Courts could avoid the Board's inability to determine the presence of
various factors on their own.
C. The Use of Precedents
1. Clemency Board Common Law
The establishment of clearly defined rules produced a marked and imme-
diate improvement in decisions. When the initial 16 cases were reconsidered,
the results were more consistent, fair, and rational than before. The black immi-
grant from the West Indies received an immediate pardon, like his white counter-
part. By the time the Board published its regulations in late November, it had
made 45 case recommendations to the President. The pattern of judgments in
the Board's subsequent 14,500 cases generally matched the pattern of these first
cases.
53
When the first 45 decisions were announced by the President, each was
accompanied by a condensed case description, which attempted to summarize the
elements of the case upon which the result was based.54 This was an effort to
establish open written precedents for the guidance of the Board and future appli-
cants. Unfortunately, this experiment failed. First, it proved too difficult to
reconstruct accurately the reasons for each collective Board decision. Second, the
Board refused to recognize the public case descriptions as open and binding
precedents. One applicant's attorney requested a recommendation of an imme-
diate pardon by citing analogous case descriptions and results, but the predomi-
nantly lay Board felt that a process of deciding cases by arguing from precedents
was too "legalistic" and would infringe upon its legitimate exercise of discretion.
Specifically bound only by its published regulations in this early period, the
Board in effect developed its own unwritten "common law" of policy precedents
even though most Board members, not being lawyers, failed to recognize this.
These precedents were applied informally but effectively by the Board. At the
time, simply having binding mitigating and aggravating factors was enough to
achieve consistency. Later, this would not be so.
Not only were cases decided more consistently as a result of having rules,
they were also decided more leniently 55 In part, this greater leniency resulted
from an emerging Clemency Board consensus that it should be clement
in deed as well as in name. Also, and more significantly, this leniency was attrib-
utable to the Board's greater confidence in its ability to make distinctions among
applicants.5 6 In the end, the Board denied clemency to seven percent of its appli-
cants,57 but by selecting those cases according to clear rules and precedents,
53 See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
54 Full case summaries were not released because of considerations of privacy.
55 The Board's original judgments on the first 16 cases included only two immediate
pardons, four denials of clemency, and an average of 16 months' alternative service for the rest.
After reconsideration, these very same cases included eight immediate pardons, no denials of
clemency, and an average of only six months' alternative service for the rest.
56 Father Hesburgh attributes the Board's leniency directly to the fact that Board members
had to follow a clear set of rules. "If we had to fight all cases one-by-one, we would not have
been as successful in making clement dispositions." Conversation with Rev. T. Hesburgh.
57 For a discussion of what kinds of cases were denied clemency, see REPoRT, supra note 11,
at 136-38, 141-43.
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it became more generous with all other applicants. Over time, four out of five
received immediate pardons" or alternative service assignments of six months or
less.
2. Impact of Time and Volume
During its first few months, the nine-member Board took about 20 minutes
on each case to calculate a baseline, identify mitigating and aggravating factors,
and reach a judgment. At the time, the Board's projected caseload was about
1,000 cases-a disappointing but manageable size. Soon, the caseload dramat-
ically increased to 15,000 cases,59 and the President set a six-month deadline for
completing all Board operations. These new developments forced radical changes
in Board operations, requiring new techniques to guide and monitor Board deci-
sions. It was no longer sufficient merely to apply the substantive rules carefully
and methodically.
Because of the expanded caseload, the Board was doubled in size to 18 mem-
bers, and the staff expanded tenfold. This had two important consequences for
the way in which cases were decided. First, the Board began hearing cases in
three-member panels rather than en banc, thus creating new possibilities for
inconsistency. Second, the presence of 400 staff attorneys transformed the Clem-
ency Board into a large and complex organization in which procedures could
no longer be as informal.60
By having three-member panels, it was hoped that Board rules could be
applied just as consistently as the nine-member Board had been doing. The idea
of having single-member judgments was rejected as too vulnerable to misappli-
cation of rules and wayward judgments. The Chairman tried to balance the
composition of each panel, wherever possible assigning one conservative, one
moderate, and one liberal to each."1 Likewise, panel memberships were changed
weekly to prevent any particular panel from drifting away from established rules.
Because of the very large caseload, panels could only spend an average of
four minutes on every case. 62 This put a heavy burden not only on Board mem-
58 For a discussion of what kinds of cases received immediate pardons, see id., at 134-135,
139-141.
59 This increase resulted from the Board's concerted efforts to educate the public about
who was eligible for the clemency program. Before this public information campaign, most
people thought that the program only included exiles and fugitives and not punished offenders.
Immediately after this information campaign was begun, Clemency Board applications showed
a sharp increase. For this reason, the President extended the application deadline for two
months (from January 31, 1975 to March 31, 1975). The Clemency Board's application rate
was still increasing when the deadline was reached. See id., at 20-23. The total number of
applications was 21,500- of which 6,000 were later found ineligible. See note 19, supra.
60 The total staff of the Clemency Board grew from 100 to 600 in a period of just a few
weeks. For a description of the "crisis management" aspect of Board operations, see RPoRT,
supra note 11, at ch. 6.
61 Among the Board members, there was unanimous approval for the concept of balancing
these panels. Very rarely did a panel result in a sharp two-against-one voting pattern. Accord-
ing to Father Hesburgh, "there was shared input from all sides, as we all recognized that we
had to compromise occasionally." Had the panels not been balanced philosophically, the judg-
ments would have been very uneven. Conversation with Rev. T. Hesburgh.
62 This figure does not include time spent by Board members reviewing staff-prepared case
summaries before panel meetings and arriving at tentative personal conclusions about what
the judgments should be. During the meetings, a consensus was reached within a few minutes
on all but the most difficult cases. Sometimes complex or controversial cases were discussed for
an hour or more before decisions were made.
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bers but also on the staff attorneys preparing cases. In addition to preparing a
factual summary for each case, attorneys were asked to calculate the baseline
and recommend which mitigating and aggravating factors might be applied by
the Board. Staff attorneys spent, on an average, four to six hours preparing each
case and obviously had more occasion than the hard-pressed Board members to
understand all aspects of a case. Even so, the Board unanimously rejected a pro-
posal to have staff attorneys recommend final case judgments based upon Board
precedent; this was considered too much of an infringement upon Board pre-
rogatives.
These shifts in Board and staff procedures were fine in theory, but very
difficult to implement in practice. Two handicaps had to be overcome. First,
half of the Board and nine-tenths of the attorneys were new to the process and
could not be expected to understand immediately the unwritten nuances of the
mitigating and aggravating factors. Second, with panels spending only four
minutes per case, there was a clear danger of hasty decisions and the arbitrary
exercise of discretion.
3. Clemency Law Reporter
These handicaps were partly overcome through the codification of Board
precedents in the Clemency Law Reporter."s The Reporter's five issues comprised
an updated "hombook" of Clemency Board practice. Each factor was defined
in explicit terms-often after Board debate-and each definition was accom-
panied by factual condensations or "squibs" of cases in which that factor had
been applied by the Board. 4 The "squibs" were reviewed by the Chairman
63 The Clemency Law Reporter began as a staff paper illustrating how the Board was
applying its mitigating and aggravating factors. Later, it served as a guide to Board precedents
and as an internal forum for staff-prepared articles on issues of professional concern. An
index to the Reporter issues, with article highlights, is included in the Clemency Board Report,
App. D. Appendix D to the Clemency Board Report also contains the entire fifth issue of the
Clemency Law Reporter, the final statement of the Board's case precedents. All five issues are
available to the public at the National Archives, Washington, D.C.
64 As illustrations, the definitions and case examples for mitigating factor #7 (Vietnam
service) and aggravating factor #4 (AWOL in Vietnam) are shown below. They are extracted
from the fifth issue of the Reporter, reproduced in REPORT, supra note 11, at 310-311, 292.
MITIGATING FACTOR #7: Tours of Service in the War Zone
This factor is applicable in cases where the applicant has served a minimum of
three months in Vietnam or on a Navy ship that had a sea patrol off the coast of
Vietnam. It can be applied where the applicant had not completed a tour, but while
on authorized leave from Vietnam assumed an unauthorized absence status. Shorter
periods of Vietnam service are not covered, unless the applicant was injured in
Vietnam or transferred out of the war zone by the military service for reasons other
than serious military or nonmilitary offenses (including AWOL offenses).
(1) During his initial enlistment, applicant served as a military policeman and
spent 13 months in that capacity in Korea. He then served two tours of duty
in Vietnam, as an assistant squad leader during the first tour, and as a squad
leader and chief of an armored car section during the second.
(2) Applicant served in Vietnam for eleven months.
(3) Applicant served in Vietnam with the .101st Airborne as a light weapons
infantryman. His tour lasted four months and 22 days. He returned to the
United States on emergency leave for five months. Applicant stated that he
went AWOL because he could not face going back to Vietnam, due to the in-
competence of his officers and the killing of civilians.
(4) The applicant served for three months in Vietnam in a combat status.
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before publication, and he deleted those which he felt were improper or mis-
leading applications of Board policy. 5 In this way, the Reporter became a means
by which the Chairman sought to channel the exercise of discretion by Board
panels and staff attorneys. He intended it to be a normative set of precedents to
which the Clemency Board was bound, at least in theory.
Staff attorneys were instructed to follow the Reporter'in making preliminary
designations of mitigating and aggravating factors -in each case as a guide for
Board members. Their designations were carefully supervised, again with the
Reporter as a guide. Finally, staff supervisors were present at all Board panel
sessions and were instructed to use the Reporter to advise Board members of any
inconsistent application of factors.
These staff procedures and the Reporter's rule codifications resulted in sev-
eral key cases being debated and decided very strictly according to the rules."8
These cases set the pattern for the remainder, but problems still arose. Many
Board members were unable or unwilling to use the Reporter themselves. Some
Board members still based their final designations of mitigating and aggravating
factors on their own personal recollections of Board rules. A few rejected the
advice of staff supervisors about how factors should be applied, insisting that
Board members could properly exercise thhir discretion without help. Despite
this resistance to formal precedents, panels rarely wandered far from what prece-
While in Vietnam, he was given emergency leave back to the United States be-
cause of the death of his mother. Applicant overstayed his leave and became
AWOL. He was apprehended shortly thereafter.
(5) Applicant saw service in Vietnam for a period of two months, 13 days. He
served as a combat medic. While in Vietnam, he broke his ankle. He was oper-
ated on and was evacuated for rehabilitation.
(6) Applicant served in Vietnam for nine months as a mortar specialist and
participated in two combat campaigns. He received fragment wounds necessitat-
ing evacuation to Japan and then to the United States.
(7) Applicant was wounded after 3 months in Vietnam, requiring two opera-
tions and prolonged convalescence.
(8) Applicant served aboard the USS Buchanan -or seven months off the
coast of Vietnam.
AGGRAVATING FACTOR #4: Desertion During Combat or Leaving Combat Zone
This factor indicates that an applicant went AWOL from his unit either during
actual enemy attack or before any reasonably anticipated enemy attack. Going AWOL
directly from Vietnam gives automatic rise to this factor. However, departing
AWOL from R&R outside of Vietnam or 'home leave from Vietnam does not consti-
tute this factor though it does constitute Aggravating Factor #10. An applicant's
reasons for his qualifying offense do not affect the applicability of this factor.
(1) Applicant was an infantryman in Vietnam when he went AWOL. He was
picked up in a rear area by Military Police and ordered back to the field by two
lieutenants. He refusdd to fly out to join his company
(2) Applicant commenced the first of three AWOLs while in Vietnam. He
flew back to California. His subsequent AWOLs occurred after his apprehension
in the U.S.
(3) Applicant stated at his trial that he became extremely frightened in com-
bat. He went AWOL after he was sent to a rear area for chills and fever.
(4) Applicant bought orders to return to the U.S. from Vietnam.
(5) Applicant received an Undesirable Discharge for unfitness; two of four
AWOL offenses occurred while applicant was in Vietnam.
65 Where these misapplications were especially prejudicial, the cases were flagged for
reconsideration.
66 Chairman Godell estimates that 100 cases, among them the most controversial, were
decided by Board votes on explicit questions of rule interpretation. Conversation with Sen. C.
Godell.
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dent dictated. When they did, their judgements were reviewed by the internal
appellate procedures discussed below.
D. Internal Appellate Review
Standing alone, the Clemency Law Reporter was not enough to ensure the
consistency of case judgments. At best, it only indicated whether factors were
being applied correctly. It did not offer any guidance to the Board in translating
those factors into a final judgment.
Consequently, some purely procedural steps were used to structure the exer-
cise of this discretion. As a standard practice, Board panels waited to discuss a
final judgment until after all applicable factors had been agreed upon and desig-
nated for the record. This procedure tended to focus Board members on the
designated factors and away from extraneous issues.
Still, cases with identical baselines and factors were often decided differ-
ently-sometimes by accident and sometimes by design. To check the panels'
judgments, an internal system of appellate review was implemented. The basic
rule of this appellate system was that any Board member could refer any panel
judgment to the full Board for reconsideration. Dissenting panel members referred
about three percent of all cases for reconsideration, often to no effect.67 More
significantly, this rule permitted the Chairman to refer cases identified by other
review procedures which the Board employed.
Staff attorneys were directed to flag cases they believed to be inconsistent
with Board precedents. These cases then went through a carefully monitored
system in which they were reviewed first by a specially trained team and then by
the Chairman. Through this procedure, approximately 100 cases were flagged
by staff attorneys and about 25 were ultimately reconsidered by the full Board. 8
The most important and unusual aspect of this appellate system was STAR-
EDEC, a computer review.6 9 A gift from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 0 STAREDEC was programmed to analyze the Clemency
Board's precedents and identify patterns in the rendering of final judgments.
STAREDEC evolved from early manual efforts to trace the impact of mitigating
and aggravating factors on case judgments. Through these ad hoc procedures,
errant cases were identified for possible reconsideration by the full Board before
final recommendations were sent to the President. Once the Board's caseload
expanded, however, this could only be done by computer. With only about one
month of planning and preparation, STAREDEC became the foundation of a
systematic review of all case judgments before their submission to the President.
67 Usually, these Board-member referrals reflected basic philosophical differences with the
policies of the Board majority. Half of these cases were referred by one Board member and
reflected his continuing disagreement with one particular Board policy decision.
68 These totals do not include cases flagged by STAREDEC.
69 STAREDEC, named after the legal concept of state deciis, cost approximately $75,000
to implement, staff time included, or roughly $5.00 per case. For a more detailed description
of STAREDEC, see REPoRT, supra note 11, at App. E. The complete STAREDEC tape is
available to the public at the National Archives, Washington, D.C.
70 The idea of having a computer review of panel judgments arose from a recommenda-
tion of the Inter-Agency Team to Survey the Presidential Clemency Board, a team of manage-
ment specialists sent by the White House to help plan the expansion of Board operations.
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STAREDEC became operational through the recording of every case judg-
ment on a computer-input sheet, along with the mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors designated by the Board for each case. Not only did this create accurate and
retrievable case records, but it also provided a means by which case judgments
could be comparatively analyzed. After separating civilian and military cases,
STAREDEC sorted them according to their respective combinations of mitigating
and aggravating factors. For each factor combination, STAREDEC identified
all prior case judgments by the Board. Again for each combination, STAREDEG
identified the median case judgment and the cases with the most extreme
("harsh" or "lenient") 7 ' judgments. In flagging these extreme cases, STAR-
EDEC had two criteria: (1) the judgment had to be among the ten percent most
deviant cases for that factor combination, and (2) the judgment had to be at
least six months away from the median for that factor combination. 2
Altogether, STAREDEC flagged approximately 1,000 cases. A staff legal
analysis team studied the summary for each case to determine whether there
appeared to be a reasonable justification for the Board's judgment. Obviously,
the facts supporting a factor could make that factor apply more strongly in one
case than in another. In effect, what the legal analysis staff did was to ascer-
tain whether each case judgment was within a resonable exercise of Board dis-
cretion. In most of the reviewed cases, there was such a justification.
Through STAREDEC, approximately 400 cases were referred to the Chair-
man for possible reconsideration. After his careful review, the Chairman then
referred some 200 cases to the full Board for reconsideration. The Board recon-
sidered the STAREDEC-flagged cases en banc (as it did the attorney-flagged
cases) with full knowledge of the Board panel's earlier judgments. In almost
every instance, the full Board overruled the earlier panel decisions.7
Some of the cases flagged by STAREDEC and staff attorneys represented
flagrant errors. Two cases had been denied clemency despite the absence of any
aggravating factors. Other cases had been treated harshly because staff attorneys
had improperly presented irrelevant and prejudicial facts, such as arrest records.
Because the Board was making decisions so quickly, the Inter-Agency Team suggested that a
"post-audit review" be conducted before case judgments were submitted to the President. The
computer program was based upon prior staff statistical analyses of Board precedents. With
the help of NASA (which absorbed most of the cost), STAREDEC took only one month to
become fully operational. Id. at App. E.
71 "Lenient" cases were flagged because some members strongly objected to a post-decision
review policy which operated only to liberalize recommendations. The Board reconsidered
only about ten cases flagged by STAREDEC as "too lenient" versus almost 200 flagged as "too
harsh." Staff attorneys rarely flagged cases they considered too lenient.
72 The following example shows how STAREDEC worked. There were 114 military
cases which had the factor combination of 2 and 6 mitigating and 1, 8, 9, and 12 aggravating.
Those cases were decided as follows:
Immediate 3 months 4-6 months 7-9 months 10-24 months no
Pardon alt. serv. alt. serv. alt. serv. alt. serv. clemency
20 24 47 11 2 5
The median Clemency Board judgment was a four-to-six-month alternative service
recommendation. The two judgments of 10-24 months of alternative service and the five "no
clemency" judgments were flagged by STAREDEC as "harsh" cases.
73 No separate records were kept of these cases. But Chairman Godell estimates that 80-
90% were overruled. Conversation with Sen. C. Godell.
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Still other cases had simply landed on the docket of a Board panel in an unusually
harsh mood. 4 Without such review, these cases would have been routinely sent
to the President as originally decided by the panels.
Another stage of appellate review took place after the President approved
the Board's case recommendations. To inform each applicant about the decision
in his case, the Board sent him a worksheet identifying the specific mitigating
and aggravating factors which the Board identified in his case. The purpose
was to give him an understanding of the reasons underlying the Board's judg-
ment. An accompanying letter informed him of his right to appeal that judg-
ment. 5
Roughly 275 applicants did appeal, and their cases were then reviewed by
the carry-over Clemency Office at the Department of Justice. The Clemency
Board had disbanded by the time the appeals were reviewed, so there was no
direct Board input into those latter decisions. In general, the Clemency Office
applied Board precedents in acting upon these appeals. An estimated 15% of
these appeals were successful, resulting in more favorable case grants of clemency
by the President.76
E. Evaluating Performance
Throughout the Clemency Board's year of operations, there was a constant
staff effort to provide the Board, and especially its Chairman, with feedback
about decision-making patterns. For most of the year, the feedback was mostly
subjective, bolstered only by administrative tallies which told little about the
quality of case judgments. Once work was under way on the Board's final report,
however, some provocative, objective data was developed-principally through
a survey of some 1,500 cases77 and the final output of STAREDEC. Although
this information was collected too late to be useful as a basis for modifying Board
practices, it did help the Board fulfill its strong commitment to be accountable to
the public for the consistency and fairness of case judgments. As it is, the data
tell a story of a decision-making process which, despite some weaknesses, accom-
plished much."
74 According to Board member Vinson, "one Board member could be compassionate one
day and- very hard-nosed the next." Conversation with Mrs. J. Vinson.
75 The worksheet and letter sent to clemency recipients are included in Id., App. D.
Applicants had already been sent a copy of their case summary.
76 Because of the Selective Service rule that applicants with six months or less of alterna-
tive service could complete this obligation through part-time work (see note 22, supra), the
Clemency Office frequently reduced appellants' assignments to six months. Appeal decisions
were made with the Clemency Law Reporter as a guide.
77 The primary purpose of this survey was to learn about the background characteristics
of clemency applicants. It was based upon a representative sample of 1,009 military cases
and 472 civilian cases. See REPoRT, supra note 11, at App. C. Survey findings are presented
in id., ch. 3, 5.
78 These "process" accomplishments do not necessarily translate into substantive achieve-
ments. The overall clemency program is in fact subject to much criticism on the ground that it
offered little if any tangible benefit to applicants. While the Presidential pardon has great
symbolic value and restores civil rights lost by reason of the underlying criminal conviction, it
does not translate directly into improved economic circumstances. The Clemency Discharge
by definition does not confer rights to veterans' benefits, and it is uncertain how it will affect
the decisions of military discharge boards and the Veterans' Administration when they review
subsequent applications for benefits by clemency applicants. Successful participation in the
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1. Process Accomplishments
Considering the Clemency Board's tumultuous and erratic beginnings, the
record shows a surprising pattern of consistent decision-making. This consistency
took a number of forms: (1) Applying mitigating and aggravating factors which
were decisive in determining case judgments; (2) judging similar cases similarly,
and different cases differently; (3) treating applicants from disadvantaged back-
grounds evenhandedly; and (4) making consistent case judgments over time.
The actual relationship of mitigating and aggravating factors to Board
decisions was always a matter of concern. The Board did not apply its factor
"guidelines" properly in its first 16 tentative judgments, but once those factors
became "rules," the picture changed. STAREDEC confirmed the Board mem-
bers' subjective sense that a number of mitigating and aggravating factors were
decisive in judging cases. STAREDEC analysis showed that 12 of the 16 miti-
gating factors and 7 of the 12 aggravating factors had either a "very strong" or
"strong" relationship to case decisions. 9 The factors most closely related to Board
decisions were two whose importance was often reaffirmed by Board members:
mitigating factor #10 (conscientious reasons for the offense) and aggravating
factor #1 (other adult convictions).
Cases with similar factors can be considered similar cases, albeit imperfectly.
If the Board were applying its rules correctly, one would generally expect to see
cases with identical mitigating and aggravating factors getting comparable judg-
ments, and cases with different factors getting different judgments. Figures 2, 3,
and 4 illustrate the Board's application of its factors in making case judgments.8 0
These tables show what happened to cases with selected factor combinations.
Although they encompass only a fraction of all Clemency Board cases," they illus-
trate the general pattern in Board decision-making. As one might expect, Board
decisions became progressively more severe as mitigating factors were subtracted
or aggravating factors added. These tables show an occasional stray case, but all
of these were flagged by STAREDEC and reviewed for possible resubmission to
the Board.
The Clemency Board was very conscious of the need not to discriminate
against persons with disadvantaged backgrounds. In fact, the first two mitigating
factors were fitended to give credit to those whose severe educational handicaps
or personal problems had contributed to their offenses.8 2 Disadvantaged persons
did not fare better than others in Board judgments, but they did receive equal
program required a sustained interest on the part of applicants, most of whom are socially,
economically, and educationally disadvantaged. As a consequence, there has been a high
drop-out rate due to undeliverable notices, failure to report for alternative service, and failure
to complete alternative service.
79 Rapopr, supra note 11, at 126-32.
80 Id. at 133.
81 The case judgments shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4 represent only 13% of the Board's
civilian cases and 3% of the military cases. Comparable tables can be made of other factor
combinations, based upon STAREDEC's final print-out.
82 Mitigating factor #41 (inability to understand obligations) and mitigating factor #2
(personal or family problems). RIPoRT, supra note 11, at 290-91.
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treatment."3 Figure 5 shows that the Board judgments neither favored nor dis-
favored blacks, whites, low IQs, high IQs, high school dropouts, college grad-
Figure 2: IMPACT OF SELECTED AGGRAVATING AND
MITIGATING FACTORS ON CIVILIAN CASE
DISPOSITIONS
Mit #
4,9,10
4,10
10
1,5
1,5,7
# of
Cases Pardons 3 AS 4-6 AS 7+ AS
4 1 - -
3 2 --
5 1 3
9 8 1 1
- - 1 24 1
...- 2
Figure 3: IMPACT OF SELECTED AGGRAVATING FACTORS
ON MILITARY CASE DISPOSITIONS
# of
Mit #
6
Cases Pa
2
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2 2 14 6 10
- 2 9 16 11
- - 1 2
Figure 4: IMPACT OF SELECTED MITIGATING FACTORS
ON MILITARY CASE DISPOSITIONS
Mit #
1,2,6,7,14
2,6,7,14
2,6,14
2,6
2
# of
Cases Pardons 3 AS 4-6 AS 7+ AS
- - 1 1
83 The Board consciously tried to be clement towards applicants with disadvantaged back-
grounds, with a number of mitigating factors (#1, 2, 3, 5, and 8) made directly applicable to
them. This resulted in evenhanded treatment, and not more favorable treatment, which the
Board intended. This indicates that applicants with disadvantaged backgrounds might have
been treated worse than others had the Board's intent not been so strong, and had these mitigat-
ing factors not existed.
Agg #
Agg #
8
5,8
1,5,8
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uates, low incomes, or high incomes.84
Figure 5: CLEMENCY BOARD TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT
CATEGORIES OF APPLICANTS
Civilian Cases Military Cases
% Pardon % No Clemency % Pardon % No Clemency
Black 75 5 47 14
White 76 1 39 7
Low IQ 59 6 46 9
Medium IQ 63 3 37 10
High IQ 68 2 33 5
High school dropout 59 3 39 9
High school graduate 77 1 41 8
College graduate 82 0 25 0
Disadvantaged eco-
normic background 72 0 41 5
Not disadvantaged 74 0 36 3
Another measure of the fairness of a process is its consistency over time. For
all but the first 5% of its cases, Clemency Board judgments were comparable
from month to month. 5 Figure 6 shows how Board case judgments varied
throughout the year, as reflected by the "pardon rate" for military and civilian
cases.8" The civilian pardon rate hovered around 90%, and the military pardon
rate around 45%. Likewise (but not shown in Figure 6), the "no clemency"
rates were also unsteady at first, then steady in the second half of the Board's
year. Note that the rapid pace of post-April Board operations did not impair
the consistency of case judgments. In fact, the more cases per panel-day, the more
consistently they were decided.
2. Process Disappointments
The generally good performance of the Clemency Board in achieving con-
sistency and fairness in its case judgments should not be misinterpreted as an
indication that everything went well. It did not. None of the techniques described
84 These statistics are drawn from the comprehensive survey of Clemency Board applicants.
See note 62, supra. For futher data about who received pardons and who were denied clem-
ency, see id., at 134-145. Only one category of applicants fared badly because of circumstances
which did not reflect upon their behavior: those for whom the military or federal court system
had not compiled complete records. This was particularly true for those who had received
administrative discharges, for whom the military had not compiled judicial records. These
partial records tended to focus on an applicant's offense and not his background, providing
more evidence about aggravating factors than about mitigating factors. This unfortunate in-
equity marred an otherwise quite evenhanded pattern of judgments.
85 The slight downward slope in the military pardon rate is attributable to the addition
of two new aggravating factors (#11 and #12) in May and June. Board member Puller be-
lieves that these late-stage rule additions resulted in uneven treatment of certain categories of
military applicants. Conversation with Mr. L. Puller.
86 REPO rT, supra note 11,.at 173.
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above was implemented perfectly, and the Board's decision-making process was
far from ideal.
Some of the mitigating and aggravating factors were based on questionable
logic. For example, the fact that an applicant was previously convicted by court-
Number of Cases Heard Per Panel Per Day
oo 0 0 0w- C _,0
Pardon Rate (as a percentage of cases decided)
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martial for AWOL made aggravating factor # 1 (other adult convictions) ap-
plicable, even though that court-marital, had it led to a discharge, would itself
have made him eligible for the clemency program. Secondly, the Board decided
to; presume that the reason for an applicant's offense was "selfish and manipu-
lative" (aggravating factor #5) in the absence of any evidence about his reasons,
placing the burden on the applicant to show that he was not selfish.87 Thirdly, the
fact that an applicant was AWOL for a long time was held against him (aggra-
vating factor #9) even though the difference between a short and long AWOL
could well be attributable only to the vigilance of the police in an applicant's
hometown.
Certain key mitigating factors such as educational handicaps (#1), family
problems (#2), and mental or physical problems (#3), were not strongly in-
fluential in very many cases,"8 even though Figure 5 shows that they did contrib-
ute to the evenhandedness of Board decisions. Conversely, one of the Board's
most controversial aggravating factors, selfish motivation for the offense (#5),
did have a decisive impact.
The panel hearings were plainly an imperfect process. 9 Thousands of cases
were decided at a rate of speed which was unfortunate, however hiecessary. While
aggregate data show that four minutes per case did not adversely affect the over-
all consistency of judgments, this fast pace sometimes interfered with the fair
treatment of individual cases. Board members, being human, occasionally sped
through cases which should have been given more time and discussion."
The process was much more ex parte than had been expected. Very few
applicants or their counsel requested personal appearances,"' so the fairness of
case judgments depended substantially on the quality of staff work in preparing
summaries. Some Board members were resentful when a staff attorney tried to
compensate for an applicant's absence by acting as his advocate.
The Clemency Law Reporter was not used to anything approaching its
true potential as a "horbook" of Board precedent. This was partly due to the
press of time, but primarily it was because some lay members of the Board clearly
felt uncomfortable with a staff-prepared instrument which monitored their
decisions.
87 This made explicit a policy that most Board members had been following before the
rules were clarified. The rationale for this policy was that all individuals had a reasonable
opportunity to explain why they committed their offenses. According to Chairman Godell,
when the factor was marked for this reason, it was not given much weight. Conversation with
Sen. C. Godell.
88 Id. at 126-132. Board member Craig "strongly disagrees" with this observation, but it is
demonstrated clearly by statistics. See Figure 5 and note 68, supra. Conversation with Mr. T.
Craig.
89 Board member Hesburgh believes that Board judgments were, if anything, more fair
when cases were decided in panels. He considers full Board judgments to have involved
"posture and charade," with the panels having given more serious attention to the circum-
stances of each applicant's case. Conversation with Rev. T. Hesburgh.
90 According to Board member Puller, panel members got tired amidst the heavy workload.
This sometimes worked to an applicant's favor, sometimes to his detriment, but always contrary
to the evenhandedness of the process. Conversation with Mr. L. Puller.
91 Although the Board's regulations did not permit personal appearances as a matter of
right, the Board almost always granted requests by applicants or their counsel. Most requests
were denied because they were not considered potentially beneficial for an applicant, such as
where a request was made after the Board had made a recommendation for an immediate
pardon in his case.
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The computer-aided appellate review system was just being perfected when
the Board went out of business. A greater number of cases would have been
reconsidered by the Board en banc had there been time. Also, like any experi-
mental computer program, STAREDEC had its flaws. It was based on a nar-
rower application of precedent than it might have been; this too could have been
corrected in time.1
2
The process of reviewing applicants' appeals after the President's decisions
was inappropriate. The appeals were heard not by the Board-which no longer
existed by then-but by a carry-over staff of attorneys who had held middle-
management positions at the Clemency Board. From all indications, it appears
that they administered the appeals process fairly, but they were the wrong indi-
viduals to be making appellate decisions.
In general, these inadequacies resulted from (1) compromises among Board
members with different philosophies, (2) the lay character of the Board, or (3)
the press of time.
3. Summary
After looking at the accomplishments-and notwithstanding the disappoint-
ments-it appears that the Clemency Board did achieve a rather good record for
consistency and fairness of judgments. Much of the credit for this must go to the
fair-mindedness and hard work of the 18 men and women who made these
judgements and, one should add, to the quality of the preparatory work of the
400 staff attorneys. But high-mindedness and hard work are not by themselves
guarantees of good results. What is more significant is that the Clemency Board
developed substantive rules, followed those rules, and evaluated its performance
in applying them. The mitigating and aggravating factors, the Clemency Law
Reporter, the internal appellate system, and the computer analysis together
provided the mechanism by which this was accomplished.
III. Applicability of the Clemency Board Model to
Judicial Sentencing
The experience of the Clemency Board in controlling adjudicative discretion
suggests that sentencing judges might improve the consistency of their decisions
if they implemented some of the techniques tested by the Board. Indeed, the
Clemency Board model may have application to decisions by parole boards, mill-
92 The principal flaw in the STAREDEC program was its inability to develop a precedent
pattern for cases which had unique combinations of mitigating and aggravating factors. Since
they were the only cases with those combinations, they were also the median cases, and thus
were not flagged. To compensate for this, the legal analysis staff automatically reviewed judg-
ments of "no clemency" or more than twelve months of alternative service. This shortcoming
of STAREDEC could be overcome by applying a regression formula to cases with unique
factor combinations or, indeed, to all cases.
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tary discharge review boards,93 and other adjudicative bodies. What makes the
Board's experience particularly transferable to sentencing judges is the compa-
rability of the alternative service decision to the sentencing decision. When a
judge chooses between probation and incarceration, and, whichever his choice,
when he fixes the length of sentence, he is doing essentially the same thing the
Clemency Board did.
Certainly, the task of the sentencing judge is more difficult. The Clemency
Board reviewed only two categories of offenses94 and had relatively homogeneous
defendants; 95 sentencing judges must act upon a much wider range of offenses
and offenders. The Clemency Board had problems enough interpreting its vague
mandate of "bind[ing] the nation's wounds" ;96 sentencing judges must base their
decisions upon the much more problematic and conflicting notions of deterrence,
rehabilitation, and the protection of society. Nonetheless, the more complicated
task facing sentencing judges should not excuse them from having to apply clear
decision-making rules. On the contrary, the complexity of judges' sentencing
decisions makes the use of such rules all the more important.
The Board offers only a first-stage experiment with baseline formulas, miti-
gating and aggravating factors, the use of case precedents, appellate review, and
computer-aided analysis of consistency. Each of these techniques needs testing
in the actual sentencing process before any conclusions can be drawn about their
usefulness to a judge. However, there is. every reason to believe that such a
sentencing experiment would be as successful as the Clemency Board model.
The components of a sentencing experiment could be much like that de-
scribed below, tailored to the needs of a particular jurisdiction. It should en-
compass as many sentencing judges and offense categories as possible to provide
the most meaningful test of consistency.97
93 Congressman Thomas Downey of New York recently introduced H.R. 11097, a bill to
alter the Armed Forces discharge review procedures. This bill would require military discharge
review boards to apply sixteen "mitigating" and fifteen "extenuating" circumstances when
reviewing applications for discharge. The bill has no provisions for aggravating circum-
stances, under the apparent assumption that the boards will consider them without being
required to do so by an Act of Congress. The experience of the Clemency Board indicates that
the inclusion of aggravating factors is even more important than mitigating factors for the pro-
tection of the individual. Aggravating factors require the structuring and recordincr of negative
feelings, preventing immaterial facts from being applied to anyone's detriment. Likewise, the
Clemency Board's legal analysis staff found that their review of aggravating factors resulted in
more reconsidered cases than the review of mitigating factors.
94 Draft offenses and military absence offenses can each be considered single categories,
although each encompasses a range of specific offenses. See note 20, supra.
95 Clemency Board applicants proved to be much more diverse than the Board had
expected, but they still were far more homogeneous than defendants in criminal trials. The
applicants were virtually all between the ages of 21-35, all military applicants had military
backgrounds per se, and virtually no one had committed a violent act as part of his draft or
military absence offense. See REPORT, supra note 11, at ch. 3.
96 Proclamation 4313, 39 Fed. Reg. 33293 (1974).
97 The 20th Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing has recently proposed an
approach similar to that developed by the Board. It involves the use of "presumptive sentences"
of a specified term for each type of offense. These sentences would be increased by fixed
percentages for repeat offenders. The presence of agravating and mitigating factors would
increase or decrease the sentence, again by a pre-established percentage. The proposal does
not allow for different combinations of factors. The Board's system allowed for more flexibility
in weighing factors and it was therefore required to institute procedures to guard against un-
warranted deviations. TWENTrETH CENTURY FUND TASK FoRcE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976).
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1. A "baseline" would be established for each type of offense, giving the
sentencing judge a starting point for his exercise of discretion. 8 The baseline
would be the presumptive sentence for all cases involvirig that offense. Also, a
minimum and maximum sentence "range" would be set for each offense, indi-
cating the outer limits of a judge's exercise of discretion. The "baseline" and
"range" would be the means by which the sentencing process would distinguish
among offenses of varying severity.99 For example, the "baseline" for armed
robbery might be five years, with a "range" of one-to-twenty years.
2. A list of mitigating and aggravating factors would be developed as the
basis for the judge's sentencing decision. The same list would be applied to all
categories of offenses. The mitigating factors might include such notions as
mental duress, restitution to victims, and evidence of current rehabilitation. The
aggravating factors might encompass the use of weapons, infliction of bodily
harm, and prior felony convictions. The selection of factors goes to the essence
of the purposes of sentencing and establishing the list would probably be a dif-
ficult and controversial process.
3. The factors would be binding upon all sentencing decisions, and judges
would consider only these factors in rendering sentences. If experience were to
demonstrate the need for the creation of additional factors, these would also be
articulated and established by rule, and not simply applied in an ad hoc fashion.
4. The information upon which each sentence is based would be restricted
to that which bears upon the designated mitigating and aggravating factors.
5. Wherever possible, sentences would be group decisions, perhaps by three-
judge panels. This would ensure that the true basis for each judgment would be
the articulated rules and- not one judge's personal standards.
6. Sentencing judges would be required to note for the record which factors
applied to a particular defendant before pronouncing sentence. (Although the
Clemency Board did not do so, each decision should also be accompanied by a
written statement of reasons.)
7. If the mitigating and aggravating factors balance each other out, the
"baseline" sentence would be imposed. If the mitigating factors outweigh the
aggravating factors, the sentence would be reduced below the baseline. Con-
versely, if the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, the sentence
would be increased above the baseline. Obviously, in no case would the sentence
fall outside the legislated outer limits of the judge's discretion.
8. Sentencing judges' identification of mitigating and aggravating factors
would have to be consistent with case precedents showing prior application of
those factors to given fact situations.
9. Each sentencing decision would be analyzed by a STAREDEC-type
computer before appeal to provide an immediate, objective measure of con-
sistency. Over time, each sentencing judge would be informed as to how com-
parable cases were being decided.
10. Sentences would be subject to appeal, with appeals based on either (1)
an unsupported application of factors, or (2) an inappropriate sentence, given
98 See Attorney General Levi's speech, recommending that a new judicial sentencing com-
mission be established to recommend a baseline for each type of offense. Note 1, supra.
99 At present, sentencing judges typically have a statutory "range" but no baseline.
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the applicable factors. Appellate courts would, through their decisions, try to
maintain consistent patterns in sentences.
11. All sentencing judges would meet periodically to ensure consistency in
their interpretation of the rules and their implementation of experimental pro-
cedures.
12. A comprehensive survey of cases would be conducted as a means of
evaluating the experiment. An identical survey of a nonexperimental "control
group" would be useful for comparison.
Not all of these techniques need be applied in any one experiment. The
three-judge concept, the STAREDEC-like computer review, and the appellate
review of sentencing decisions are separable items. However, all aspects of the
model reinforce one another, enhancing the prospects for a successful experiment.
Reduced to its simplest features, this Clemency Board model consists of
establishing substantive rules, following those rules, and measuring performance.
The exercise of discretion is controlled, and the quality of decision-making -im-
proves as a result.
Even with its discretion disciplined, the Clemency Board had arbitrary mo-
ments and applicants were sometimes asked to do too much or too little alter-
native service. Sentencing judges, with almost limitless discretion, are incon-
sistent much more often. When they are, the price is paid by an underprotected
public or by an overpunished offender. Either way, the price is too high.
